

Racially Discriminatory State Senate Redistricting in Long Island

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Summary

Census figures show that the non-Hispanic white population of Long Island has declined during each of the last two decades. But Long Island has maintained its share of the total state population – and its share of State Senate districts – because of the growth of black, Hispanic, and Asian-American populations. The large and growing African-American and Latino communities in Nassau and Suffolk counties are concentrated in the same villages and hamlets. Districts boundaries that divide one group, diluting its voting power, divide both. The African-American and Latino communities have been systematically split each time the Senate district boundaries have been redrawn after the census. This pattern can be seen in 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2002 in Nassau County, and in 1982, 1992, and 2002 in Suffolk County:

- The boundary between Senate Districts 6 and 8 in Nassau. In 1972 that boundary ran through Roosevelt, and since 1972 it has remained at the Roosevelt-Uniondale boundary. The two districts have been changed greatly over the decades. Both were at first entirely within the Town of Hempstead; then they were extended into the Town of Oyster Bay as far as the county line; and District 8 later reached across the county line into the Town of Babylon. But all the changes have preserved one fixed feature: the line dividing the minority communities. Uniondale and the Village of Hempstead are always in District 6, Roosevelt and Freeport always in District 8.
- The boundary line dividing the minority communities within the Town of Babylon. In 1982, 1992, and 2002 the minority communities in Babylon were divided by a line that was nearly identical in each decade, changing by only a few blocks. The line runs southward from the Babylon-Huntington town line through Wyandanch and West Babylon, then divides North Lindenhurst, Lindenhurst, Copiague, and Amityville. In 1982, the part of the town northwest of this boundary was attached to District 5, which extended north to the Sound in Oyster Bay and Glen Cove. In 1992 and 2002, the same area was attached to District 8, a South Shore Nassau district extending to Baldwin Harbor. But the line dividing the minority communities remained fixed.
- The boundary line dividing the minority communities within the Town of Islip. Senate Districts 3 and 4 changed extensively from 1982 to 1992, and again in 2002 – except in one place. The portion of the district boundary that divides Brentwood – and thereby splits the minority communities in the Town of Islip – is precisely identical in the three decades, running from the town line at Moreland Road in the north, to the intersection of Commack Road and Candlewood Road in the south.

* I directed the staff work on redistricting for the Minority (Democratic) Leaders of the New York State Senate from 1980 through my retirement at the end of 2005. I have offered advice to the redistricting staff of the Democratic Senate Conference during the current redistricting process, and exchanged information with them, but I do not now work for or represent the Minority Leader. I consulted with the Committee on Election Law of the Bar Association of the City of New York during the preparation of their 2007 report on reform of the redistricting process, and was the principal drafter of the text, but I do not, and never did, represent or speak for the Committee or the Association. (I am not a lawyer.) *The opinions I express are solely my own.*

Overview

For four decades in a row, Long Island minority communities have been systematically split by the State Senate district boundaries, diluting the voting power of black and Hispanic voters. All nine Long Island districts have repeatedly been designed to have super-majorities of non-Hispanic white voters.

Long Island's black and Hispanic populations have now been systematically split in every Senate redistricting plan adopted by the Legislature during the one-person-one-vote era: the plans enacted in 1972, 1982 (slightly revised in 1984), 1992, and 2002. (During the 1960's, court-imposed plans – not legislation – brought New York State into compliance with the original one-person-one-vote court rulings.)

The Legislature and the Governor must now decide whether this practice is to be repeated again in 2012 – extending the discriminatory pattern through a full half-century.

This issue involves no conflict between the interests of Latino and African-American communities. In both counties, the black and Hispanic populations are concentrated in the same incorporated villages and unincorporated hamlets. Districts that split one group, diluting their voting power, will split the other group as well. Districts that permit one group to exercise their full voting power will do the same for the other.

A series of maps shows the pattern, displaying the demographic data from each decennial census, with the Senate district boundaries for the same decade. Appendix A explains and lists the maps.

A Question of Justice – Not of Law

A group of voters brought suit to challenge the 2002 Long Island Senate districts, but a three-judge Federal District Court ruled, in *Rodriguez v. Pataki* (2004), that they were not entitled to relief under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Whether the Court ruled correctly is not the important question now. The prospects for challenging a new discriminatory redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act will depend largely on recent demographic trends, and on a statistical analysis of recent voting patterns that no one has yet performed.

But the decision facing the Legislature and the Governor is not primarily a question of law. It is a question of justice.

The courts set limits: some things the Legislature and Governor must do, and some that they must not do. Within those limits, the Legislature and the Governor enjoy broad discretion to act wisely or unwisely, justly or unjustly. If that were not so, it would not much matter whom we elect, or how the districts are drawn.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the systematic splitting of Long Island minority communities by Senate district boundaries *may*, as a matter of law, be extended

through a full half-century. That does not even begin to address the question of what the Legislature *should* do, or what the Governor *should* approve.

The Co-Chairmen of the Legislative Task Force on Reapportionment (LATFOR) have argued that Governor Cuomo should not veto a redistricting bill merely because it was designed by them, and not by an independent commission. They urge the Governor to base his decision on the bill's substance, not its source.

Surely, though, if the racially discriminatory Long Island Senate boundaries of 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2002 are continued in 2012, then Governor Cuomo will have compelling grounds to veto the reapportionment bill – because of what it does, regardless of who has done it.

Legislative Decision-Making: the View from Inside

In 2002, the Senate Majority took advantage of an ambiguous constitutional provision to increase the number of Senate districts from 61 to 62. This was primarily a device to prevent the reapportionment of a district, from upstate to downstate, as the result of population trends. But it turns out that consideration was secretly given to the creation of 63 districts, for reasons that involved Long Island.

A staff member, who handled the technical work in designing the Senate districts, discussed this subject in a confidential July 20, 2001 memo titled “Size of the Senate,” addressed to Sen. Dean Skelos, who was then the Co-Chairman of the Legislative Task Force on Reapportionment (LATFOR).** The memo became public during the *Rodriguez* case. The second paragraph begins: “I have previously stated my contention that the only reason to go to 63 is to strengthen the Long Island delegation by combining politically undesirable areas in the extra district.” [Emphasis in original.]

The memo then explains the reasons for rejecting this idea:

Initially, my thinking was that in going to 63 we would strengthen all nine members by carving out a tenth district strictly on the island, combining all the minority areas from Elmont on the Nassau/Queens border east to Brentwood in the town of Islip. This would serve the dual purpose of carving out politically undesirable areas and at the same time demonstrate sensitivity to testimony received at both the Nassau/Suffolk and Westchester public hearings. There are four major reasons mitigating against this scenario:

** Memorandum titled “Size of the Senate,” July 20, 2001, *Rodriguez v. Pataki* SDNY 02 Civ. 618. (PDF file name: “Not63.”) The author's name has been redacted from the copy of the memo accompanying this statement. The document is not otherwise altered, and the original can be provided when necessary. The important issue is not the conduct of a staff member, but the decisions made by the policy-makers to whom the memo is addressed. The addressees are: Sen. Dean Skelos, then the Co-Chairman of LATFOR (since elected Majority Leader); Steve Boggess, then the Secretary of the Senate (since retired); and the late Vinnie Bruy, then the public member of LATFOR appointed by Majority Leader Bruno, and an expert analyst of political data for the Republican Party.

- a. At a district population of 275,391, the deviation from the ideal for 10 districts on the island would be –8.57%. With a total permissible deviation of 10%, this would give us precious little room to maneuver elsewhere in the state;
- b. While this minority district is theoretically possible, it is extremely unsightly and would most likely bring scrutiny ala Shaw v. Reno;
- c. Senator Trunzo lives squarely within one of the major minority concentrations which would be included in the minority district (Brentwood).
- d. The additional district almost certainly would not be a republican pickup. Thus, all else being equal, the republican majority would be 36-27

Apparently it was decided that the “politically undesirable areas” could be handled just as well by splitting them evenly, once again, among several districts. There is nothing secret about the how this was done. It is described in detail below.

The geographic pattern. Contiguous, large (and growing) concentrations of black and Hispanic population have been systematically split, so as to dilute the voting power of minority-group voters.

- In **Nassau County**, there are large and growing black and Hispanic populations in the compact, contiguous region comprising Freeport, Roosevelt, Uniondale, Hempstead, West Hempstead, Lakeview, South Hempstead, and Baldwin. These minority populations have been repeatedly split between the 6th Senate District and the 8th Senate District. The adjoining area of Westbury and New Cassel has meanwhile been placed in the 7th Senate District, along with Elmont and South Floral Park, while North Valley Stream has been placed in the 9th Senate District. South Hempstead and Baldwin have been divided between the 8th and 9th Senate Districts. The 2002 Senate Plan almost exactly reproduced the boundaries that divided the Nassau County minority communities in 1982 (also 1984) and 1992.
- In **Suffolk County**, the large and growing black and Hispanic populations in the Town of Babylon were split between the 4th and 5th Senate Districts in 1982, and between the 4th and 8th Senate Districts in 1992, by a line dividing Amityville, Copiague, North Lindenhurst, West Babylon and Wyandanch. The black and Hispanic populations in the Town of Islip have been split between the 3rd and 4th Senate Districts by a line through Brentwood. The 2002 Senate Plan also reproduced the 1982 (also 1984) and 1992 divisions of the Suffolk County minority communities.

The demographic pattern. The creation of non-Hispanic white super-majorities has repeatedly been achieved by balancing the minority populations between adjoining districts so as to minimize minority-group voting strength in any one district.

- The 2002 Senate Plan continued to create nine districts with non-Hispanic white super-majorities, even though the non-Hispanic white share of Long Island’s voting-age population declined from 85.4% in 1990 to 78.2% in 2000.
- In absolute numbers, Long Island’s total non-Hispanic white population declined by 89,228, or 4.1%, during the 1990’s. Long Island nevertheless experienced a population growth of 5.5% during the decade – keeping pace with the statewide

growth rate and maintaining Long Island's share of representation in the State Senate – only because the growth of minority-group populations more than offset the decline in non-Hispanic white population. The 2002 Senate Plan, however, minimized the role of minority-group voters in electing Long Island's State Senate delegation.

- In 1992 the Legislature drew the Long Island Senate districts so that the voting-age population in all nine districts would be at least 76.8% non-Hispanic white, according to the 1990 census.
- The minority populations were so artfully divided that, even after a decade in which Long Island's black, Asian, and Hispanic populations grew rapidly, and the non-Hispanic white population declined, the voting-age population of every Senate district created in 1992 was at least 68.5% non-Hispanic white, according to the 2000 census.
- In the 2002 Senate Plan, the voting-age population in all nine districts was at least 69.0% non-Hispanic white, according to the 2000 census.
- **The 2002 Senate Districts and the 2010 Census.** In absolute numbers, Long Island's total non-Hispanic white population declined again in the 2000's, by 159,315 persons (7.6%) – even more rapidly than in the 1990's. But once again Long Island's total population kept pace with the statewide growth rate – only because the growth of minority-group populations more than offset the decline in non-Hispanic white population.

The non-Hispanic white share of Long Island's voting-age population, which declined from 85.4% to 78.2% during the 1990's, declined further to 70.9% in 2010. But the 2002 Senate district boundaries divided the minority communities so artfully, that in 2010 the non-Hispanic white voting-age population of the nine Senate districts still ranged from 62.5% to 84.5%.

- **Nassau County in the 2002 Senate Redistricting.** The 6th Senate District as drawn in 1992, had a 16.2% black population (including all persons who identified themselves as black, whether Hispanic or non-Hispanic) according to the 1992 census, while the adjoining 8th Senate District had a 15.6% black population. The Hispanic population of the 6th Senate District was 6.9%, and the Hispanic population of the 8th Senate District was 6.6%.

According to the 2000 census, the minority populations of those districts grew rapidly, but nearly evenly, on both sides of the Senate district boundary. The black population in 2000 was 17.8% of the 6th Senate District (as drawn in 1992) and 17.1% of the 8th Senate District (as drawn in 1992). The Hispanic population in 2000 was 12.1% of the 6th Senate District (as drawn in 1992) and 11.1% of the 8th Senate District (as drawn in 1992).

Under the 2002 Senate Plan, the black population was reduced from 17.8% to 17.5% in the 6th Senate District, and reduced from 17.1% to 16.9% in the 8th Senate District.

The Hispanic population was reduced from 12.1% to 11.9% in the 6th Senate District, and increased from 11.1% to 11.2% in the 8th Senate District.

- **Suffolk County in the 2002 Senate Redistricting.** The 3rd Senate District, as drawn in 1992, had a Hispanic population of 10.3% according to the 1992 census, while the adjoining 4th Senate District had a 9.1% Hispanic population. The 3rd Senate District had a 5.8% black population (including all persons who identified themselves as black, whether Hispanic or non-Hispanic), and the 4th Senate District had an 8.6% black population.

In Suffolk County, too, the 2000 census showed the minority populations growing rapidly, but nearly evenly, on both sides of the Senate district boundary. The Hispanic population in 2000 was 16.4% of the 3rd Senate District (as drawn in 1992) and 13.5% of the 4th Senate District (as drawn in 1992). The black population in 2000 was 8.6% of the 3rd Senate District (as drawn in 1992) and 10.9% of the 4th Senate District (as drawn in 1992).

Under the 2002 Senate Plan, the Hispanic population was increased from 16.4% to 17.0% in the 3rd Senate District, and reduced from 13.5% to 13.0% in the 4th Senate District. The black population was increased from 8.6% to 8.9% in the 3rd Senate District, and reduced from 10.9% to 10.6% in the 4th Senate District.

Racial gerrymandering. Dividing large concentrations of black and Hispanic voters so as to dilute their voting power – and, conversely, concentrating non-Hispanic white populations to create nothing but super-majority non-Hispanic white districts – has been the only consistent principle followed in drawing the Senate districts.

- **The boundary between the 6th and 8th Senate Districts in Nassau.** Both districts have changed greatly over the decades. In 1972, the 8th Senate District extended from the New York City line to the Hempstead/Oyster Bay town line; in 1982, the western boundary of the 8th Senate District was moved to South Hempstead, and the eastern boundary was moved to the Suffolk County line; in 1992, the 8th Senate District was extended across the county line into the Town of Babylon. In 1972, the 6th Senate District was entirely within the Town of Hempstead; in 1982 and 1992 the 6th Senate District was extended through the Town of Oyster Bay to the Suffolk County line. Throughout the three decades, however, the boundary dividing the minority communities between the 6th and 8th Senate Districts remained virtually unchanged. Under the 2002 Senate Plan, it remained virtually unchanged for a fourth decade. (In 2002, as in 1982 and 1992, the principal boundary between the two districts followed the Roosevelt-Uniondale boundary line.)
- **The boundary line dividing the minority communities within the Town of Babylon.** In 1982 a section of the Town of Babylon – comprising East Farmingdale and North Amityville, and parts of Wyandanch, West Babylon, North Lindenhurst, Copiague, and Amityville – was attached to the 5th Senate District, which extended northward to the Long Island Sound, extending into the Towns of Huntington and

Oyster Bay and the City of Glen Cove. It was primarily a North Shore district. In 1992, the same part of the Town of Babylon – identical except for three blocks – was attached to the 8th Senate District, a South Shore district extending into the southern part of the Town of Oyster Bay and thence into the Town of Hempstead. Under the 2002 Senate Plan, the line through the minority community in Babylon again remained unchanged for most of its length – southward from the Babylon-Huntington town line almost to the northern boundary of the Village of Lindenhurst – and then divided Lindenhurst, Copiague, and Amityville along a line only slightly different from the 1992 boundary.

- **The boundary line dividing the minority communities within the Town of Islip.** The 3rd and 4th Senate Districts changed extensively from 1982 to 1992, and again change extensively under the 2002 Senate Plan – except in one place. The portion of the district boundary that divides Brentwood – and thereby splits the minority communities in the Town of Islip – is precisely identical in the three plans, from the town line at Moreland Road in the north to the intersection of Commack Road and Candlewood Road in the south.

The consistent pattern, shown in the three examples just given, suggests that the portions of the Senate district boundaries that split the minority communities – within the towns of Hempstead, Babylon, and Islip – were established first, and that any necessary changes (such as to equalize district populations in accordance with the latest census) were made around those fixed features.

- **The splitting of the minority communities did not result from any effort to preserve existing local government subdivisions or traditionally recognized communities.** Although it has been necessary to cut through county, town and village boundaries in Long Island in order to comply with the one-person-one-vote principle, the division of these local government units has been far more extensive than necessary. In 1992, for example, the Legislature created, for the first time, a pair of Nassau-Suffolk districts, one of which – the 8th Senate District – splits the minority population in the Town of Babylon. If the Legislature had wished to keep local government units intact insofar as possible, it could have created a single Nassau-Suffolk district by including more of the Town of Huntington in the 5th Senate District, and it need not have brought the 8th Senate District into Babylon at all.

The 2002 Senate Plan again created two Nassau-Suffolk Senate districts. A rejected alternative proposal, previously submitted to the Reapportionment Task Force, would have created only one Nassau-Suffolk district. The 2002 Senate Plan also divided 10 incorporated villages, and 51 of the traditionally recognized unincorporated hamlets that have been designated as Census Places. The rejected alternative proposal divided no incorporated village, and only 11 of the traditionally recognized unincorporated hamlets.

Systematically splitting the minority communities, decade after decade, undermines democracy.

- Splitting the minority populations denies representation to communities defined by actually shared interests, not just by race, and makes it difficult for their senators to respond to their needs. Education is the best example. Education is the largest single category of state and local government expenditure in New York State. Funding for local school districts is the largest single item in the state budget, and the education aid formula is the most contentious issue the Legislature addresses each year. In Nassau and Suffolk counties, the school districts with large minority populations tend to be less affluent, less able to finance public education from their local tax base, and less well financed than the districts with very small minority populations.

Systematically splitting minority populations not only dilutes the voting power of minority voters, as such, but also dilutes the power of voters who have a shared interest in changing the state school aid formula to reduce the inequality in school financing. The senators, wishing to be re-elected, are then forced to respond to those voters who have a vested interest in the *status quo*.

- **Splitting the minority communities discourages interracial coalition-building.** Racially polarized or segregated politics has a corrosive effect on democracy. Interracial coalition-building should be encouraged. But redistricting so as to dilute minority voting power and minimize the minority percentage in any one district has just the opposite effect. Drawing districts in which black or Hispanic voters are not just a minority, but the smallest possible minority, reduces their value as coalition partners, and makes it easy – and tempting – for candidates to win election without appealing for their support or addressing their interests.

Appendix A: Mapping the Discriminatory Pattern in State Senate Redistricting

The maps show the black or Hispanic percentage of the total population in each census tract, from each census since 1970. Two maps show the combined black and Hispanic percentage from the 2010 census. In order to present the maps at the largest possible scale, they show only the part of each county where large Latino and African-American communities are located.

It was not possible to locate tract-level data for the Hispanic population from the 1970 census, so the maps showing Hispanic population begin with the 1980 census.

The percentages are based on total population – all ages. This measure has been chosen in order to provide comparable data across the five decades. It was not possible to locate voting-age population (VAP) data from 1970. But the geographic distribution of the VAP for each group will be nearly the same as the geographic distribution of the total population.

The data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 have been matched to the census tracts from the 2000 census, which provide the geographic basis for those maps. The maps showing data from the 2010 census use the latest census tract boundaries. The Senate districts enacted in 1982 were revised slightly in 1984, to equalize the populations of several pairs of adjoining districts in compliance with the NYS Constitution's 'block-on-border' rule. The final 1984 district boundaries are shown.

The black percentage includes all persons who identified themselves in the census as black, whether or not they also identified themselves as Hispanic. The maps based on the censuses of 2000 and 2010, which permitted multiple-race responses, include all persons who identified themselves as black, whether or not they also listed another race. This is the method of tabulation prescribed for enforcement of civil rights laws in US Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 00-02, *Guidance on Aggregation and Allocation of Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights Monitoring and Enforcement*. It also accords with the method prescribed by the US Supreme Court in *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 US 461, FN1 (2003). The maps showing combined percentages are based on the sum of the non-Hispanic black and Hispanic populations.

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Map Page 5: Black percentages for Nassau County from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Map Pages 6-8: Hispanic percentages for Nassau County, 1980-2000, with the Senate district boundaries enacted after each respective census (1984, 1992, 2002).

Map Page 9: Hispanic percentages for Nassau County from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Map Page 10: The combined black and Hispanic percentage for each tract from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Map Pages 11-14: Black percentages for Suffolk County, 1970-2000, with the Senate district boundaries enacted after each respective census (1972, 1984, 1992, 2002).

Map Page 15: Black percentages for Suffolk County from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Map Pages 16-18: Hispanic percentages for Suffolk County, 1980-2000, with the Senate district boundaries enacted after each respective census (1984, 1992, 2002).

Map Page 19: Hispanic percentages for Suffolk County from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Map Page 20: The combined black and Hispanic percentage for each tract from the 2010 census, with the current (2002) district boundaries.

Appendix B: Long Island Senate District Demographics

The data for race and Hispanic origin in the tables below are for voting-age population (VAP). Some of the percentages given in the section of the fact sheet on ‘The Demographic Pattern’ (pp. 4-5) refer to total population, the same variable displayed in the maps. Where the fact sheet gives voting-age population, that is stated in the text.

Current Long Island Senate Districts (2002 Plan) – 2000 Census Data

District	Population	Deviation from Ideal Population	% Deviation	Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic White Voting Age Population	Hispanic Voting Age Population	Black Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic Black Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic Asian Voting Age Population	Hispanic plus Non-Hispanic Black Voting Age Population
1	305,989	-83	-0.03%	229,551	85.31%	6.92%	5.44%	5.19%	1.66%	12.11%
2	305,990	-82	-0.03%	226,892	88.46%	4.38%	2.10%	1.94%	4.81%	6.33%
3	305,989	-83	-0.03%	222,314	74.25%	15.59%	7.77%	7.09%	2.37%	22.68%
4	305,991	-81	-0.03%	225,017	76.41%	11.92%	9.33%	8.77%	2.17%	20.69%
5	305,990	-82	-0.03%	231,528	84.14%	7.18%	3.39%	3.23%	4.97%	10.41%
6	305,993	-79	-0.03%	229,090	69.04%	11.15%	16.51%	15.87%	3.48%	27.02%
7	305,991	-81	-0.03%	233,048	73.07%	9.26%	8.78%	8.36%	8.54%	17.62%
8	305,990	-82	-0.03%	225,348	71.85%	10.31%	15.69%	15.06%	2.25%	25.37%
9	305,990	-82	-0.03%	231,965	81.44%	8.48%	5.98%	5.67%	3.78%	14.15%

Current Long Island Senate Districts (2002 Plan) – 2010 Census Data

District	Population	Deviation from Ideal Population	% Deviation	Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic White Voting Age Population	Hispanic Voting Age Population	Black Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic Black Voting Age Population	Non-Hispanic Asian Voting Age Population	Hispanic plus Non-Hispanic Black Voting Age Population
1	341,254	28,704	9.18%	263,335	78.99%	12.38%	5.94%	5.50%	2.42%	17.88%
2	314,159	1,609	0.51%	237,688	84.51%	6.45%	2.86%	2.60%	6.06%	9.05%
3	322,962	10,412	3.33%	242,762	65.41%	23.21%	8.88%	7.79%	3.11%	31.00%
4	309,135	-3,415	-1.09%	235,930	69.17%	17.14%	10.92%	9.94%	3.28%	27.08%
5	316,844	4,294	1.37%	242,759	76.24%	10.86%	4.30%	3.95%	8.62%	14.81%
6	307,789	-4,761	-1.52%	236,495	62.47%	16.43%	16.07%	15.22%	5.53%	31.65%
7	311,141	-1,409	-0.45%	238,755	63.01%	12.88%	9.87%	9.35%	14.20%	22.23%
8	305,226	-7,324	-2.34%	231,366	65.77%	15.76%	16.16%	15.16%	2.93%	30.92%
9	304,372	-8,178	-2.62%	234,542	71.43%	12.81%	10.30%	9.60%	5.61%	22.41%

The population deviations in the second table do not reflect the subtraction of prisoners in state and federal custody from the places of incarceration, or the reallocation of the prisoners to their prior home addresses, as now required by law. As of this date, LATFOR has not yet produced the amended database.